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A deliciously implicit conceit of Truth in Fiction is that Sherlock Holmes is not
law abiding [1]. In recent years, the pleadings for the defense have had it that Holmes
does not fall entirely within the jurisdiction of the laws. John Woods mounts a far
more radical defense. He urges his readers to refuse to convict, thereby nullifying
the laws. To make the case, he deploys a theoretical concept, the concept of truth
in situ. The concept suggests another, cake-and-eat-it, defense of Holmes. On this
defense, the laws retain their authority and their full jurisdiction over Holmes, but
the chap is innocent. Sherlock is law abiding.
The laws upon which Holmes stands indicted are three:
I. the something law: everything whatever is something or other
II. the existence law: reference and quantification are existentially loaded
III. the truth law: no truth-evaluable sentence that discomplies with the something
law or the existence law can be true.
We read that Holmes mustered the Baker Street irregulars. Since Holmes does not
exist, the existence law pronounces that the sentence cannot refer to him. Since the
sentence cannot refer to him, the truth law pronounces that the sentence cannot be
true. Generalizing from Holmes and The Sign of the Four to all fictions and their
creatures, the corollary is a fourth law:
IV. the fiction law: there is nothing to which the sentences of fiction refer and
nothing of which they are true.
If the fact of the case is that there is no Holmes, the laws dictate our reasoning from
that fact.
Those whom Woods calls “pretendists” stipulate to the fact of the case and
accept the authority of the laws. The sentence about Holmes and the Baker Street
irregulars cannot be true. Yet the sentence is not in the same boat as any run of
the mill sentence that is false by reference failure. Sentences known to be false by
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reference failure leave us emotionally untouched and cognitively disengaged. We
award them a big shrug. By contrast, knowing that there is no Holmes, and that
the bit about the irregulars cannot be true, we nevertheless find ourselves very much
turned on emotionally and cognitively. We care. We want to know more. We turn
the pages. Attuned to these data, pretendists propose that the jurisdiction of the
four laws is only partial and that fictions and their creatures also answer to another
authority. In Kendall Walton’s version of the proposal, fictions function as props in
regulated games of make-believe [2]. In these games, we are prescribed to imagine
that there is a Holmes and that he called in the Baker Street irregulars. Our so
imagining is thought to explain our emotional and cognitive engagement.
Woods shares the pretendists’ deep respect for reader responses, but he doubts
that regulated acts of imagining or make-believe adequately explain the contours of
readerly life. He also shares the pretendists’ aversion to joining the Meinongians in
contesting the fact of the case, that there is no Sherlock Holmes. So, he defies the
laws. The fiction law must go. With it goes the truth law and the existence law.
The something law is harmless and may tarry.
Philosophers have been wary of this kind of move for several reasons. Some have
nothing to do with fiction in particular: they concern the laws’ general plausibility or
methodological power across the board. For the record, Woods is not sympathetic,
but set that aside. Holmes’s defiance of the laws raises a more acute problem. The
fact of the case is that there is no Holmes, but the truth is that Holmes summoned
the irregulars. Indeed, “Holmes” refers to Holmes. Inconsistencies loom. And
inconsistencies trouble us. Woods therefore endeavors to remove our troubles. One
remedy, a strong dose of paraconsistent logic, is not the preferred cure. The better
cure is to embrace an idea that Woods finds in Aristotle, the idea of truth in a
respect, or truth in situ [3].
Truth is one thing and “true” is not ambiguous; but, all the same, truth-makers
vary. Take these inconsistent sentences:
W. Holmes is a fictional character.
S. Holmes mustered the Baker Street irregulars.
(W) is made true by the extra-story world, while (S) is made true by Doyle’s act of
telling the story. We may say that (S) is true in situ the story, meaning by that just
that Doyle’s story telling makes it true. The payoff is, first, that readers implicitly
grasp the relation between the truth of (S) and its truth in situ the story. The idea is
empirically plausible: readers are aware of — constantly reminded of — the source
of sentences like (S). Second, our sensitivity to the relation between the truth of (S)
and its truth in situ the story inoculates thinkers against making inferences where
the inconsistency between (S) and (W) threatens to wreak havoc.
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So concludes the case for nullifying the laws. Turn now to cake-and-eat-it. The
claim will not be that cake-and-eat-it dominates nullification. As noted, Woods is
unsympathetic to the laws, quite apart from Holmes’s predicament. The claim is
only that Woods should welcome cake-and-eat-it as a contender, especially in so far
as it leverages and clarifies the theoretical concept of truth in situ.
The concept is just the same as one that comes to life in other philosophical
contexts, notably the debate about predicates of personal taste [4]. When it comes
to matters of taste, faultless disagreements abound. For example:
Dom: Durian tastes heavenly.
John: By Jove, it does not!
Neither party to the exchange is at fault. Each has ample and vivid evidence for
their take on durian. Moreover, the exchange is not pointless, for they know that
they share useful information [5]. So the exchange is faultless, but it is also a
disagreement. Dom’s view on the topic is at odds with John’s. The question is
how to understand such cases of faultless disagreement. “Contextualists” maintain
that what Dom asserts is the proposition that durian tastes heavenly-to-Dom and
John asserts the proposition is that durian does not taste heavenly-to-John. On this
view, John does not deny the very proposition that Dom asserts. The propositions
are consistent. The task is then to recover a sense in which the exchange is a
genuine disagreement. By contrast, “truth relativists” contend that Dom asserts the
proposition that durian tastes heavenly and John denies the very same proposition.
Yet their disagreement is faultless because Dom speaks truly and so does John.
Needless to say, truth is one thing; “true” is not ambiguous.
Why not think that Dom’s assertion is true in situ Dom and John’s is true in
situ John? The thought is perfectly natural. A fact about Dom — his having his
taste — makes what he says true, and a fact about John — his having a different
taste — makes true what he says. Relativists about predicates of personal taste do
not use the “in situ” phrase. They say that in exchanges like these, a sentence is
true in a context of assessment set by a personal taste parameter. What Dom says
is true in the context of assessment set by Dom’s personal taste and what John says
is true in the context of assessment set by John’s personal taste, but one asserts and
the other denies the very same content.
Truth relativists have worked out the details, but their semantic tools have not
been applied to fiction [6]. Why not try out a truth relativist approach to fiction,
seeing if it puts meat on the bones of the concept of truth in situ? After all, truth
relativism seems to deliver just what Woods wants. Return to (W) and (S). (W)
is true if and only if (W) is true in a context of assessment where the extra-story
world sets a truth-maker parameter. By the same token, (S) is true if and only if
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(S) is true in a context if assessment where a story sets a truth-maker parameter. In
addition, (S) is true in the same sense of “true” as is (W). Watch out, though! The
meaning of (S) is not given either by the proposition pin the story, Holmes summons
the irregularsq or by the proposition pit is true in the story that Holmes summons
the irregularsq. The meaning of (S) is given quite simply by the proposition pHolmes
summons the irregularsq.
Truth is one thing, but every truth has a truth-maker, and there are different
truth-makers. “Holmes summoned the irregulars” is true in situ something (The
Sign of the Four) and “Doyle made Holmes up” is also true in situ something (the
extra-story world). In other words, Woods should green light a new law:
the location, location, location law: no sentence is true unless it is true
in situ some context of assessment.
Again, the LLL law does not identify truth with truth in situ. It merely acknowledges
that every truth is made true by something. There is the cake; now we can eat it
too. The fact of the case is that there is no Sherlock Holmes. The proposition that
there is no Sherlock Holmes is plainly true in situ the extra-story world. Woods
concedes the something law. The existence and truth laws are consistent with the
LLL law. One may hold both that no truth-evaluable sentence that discomplies with
the something law or the existence law can be true, and that no sentence can be
true unless it is true in situ some context of assessment. The truth law and LLL law
together imply that “Holmes” refers in (S). Presumably, “Holmes” refers to Holmes
in situ The Sign of the Four.
More importantly, the conjunction of the three cardinal laws with the LLL law
no longer implies the fiction law, namely that,
there is nothing to which the sentences of fiction refer and nothing of
which they are true.
What would imply the fiction law, given the conjunction? The answer is, instruc-
tively, throwing in
the one site hypothesis: there is exactly one context of assessment, the
extra-story world.
The problem is not with any of the three cardinal laws; the problem is with the
hypothesis. Woods denies the one site hypothesis anyway, in company with anyone
driven by cake-and-eat-it proclivities. Even better, denying the hypothesis is rea-
sonable as long as we have the LLL law. The appeal of the hypothesis was that we
want to understand the “world” and we must guard against a bunch of made up
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stuff interfering with that empirical project as we run our inferences. A recognition
of how darn good we are at keeping our locations straight means we need not fear
much interference from fiction as we run our inferences. It also explains why we are
not foolish to be so interested in truths in fiction. The impulse to explore is not
spent at the boundaries of the extra-story world.
Reading Woods, I found myself appreciating how apt it is, when thinking about
the problems of fiction, to craft viable new positions. The remarks above are offered
in the same spirit as animates Truth in Fiction. Eventually we must narrow down
the options. Part of me hopes that is no time soon.
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